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Two abstract results are given for the existence of optimal contract selection mechanisms
in principal-agent models; by a suitable reformulation of the (almost) incentive com-
patibility constraint, they deal with both single- and multi-agent models. In particular,
it is shown that the existence results in a series of papers by F.H. Page [9, 10, 12, 13]
follow from these two results.
1 Introduction
In a series of papers, F.H. Page presented existence results for optimal contract selection
mechanisms for a number of principal-agent models [9, 12, 13]. These models involve both
moral hazard and incomplete information aspects (in the sense of e.g. Harsanyi [6] and
Meyerson [8]). A quite related existence result was also given by Page for the existence of
an optimal Stackelberg strategy in a game with incomplete information [10]. In some form
or another, all these models deal with the maximization of the principal's expected utility
function
Z
T
U(t; f(t))(dt)
over the set of all contract selection mechanisms f : T ! K that are (i) individually ratio-
nal and (ii) incentive compatible. Here  stands for the principal's subjective probability
distribution of the types, T being the set of all types that the agent(s) can report to have.
By working with a mechanism f , the principal is committed to using the contract f(t) from
K if type t is reported by the agent(s).
The nature of the incentive compatibility constraint (see Denitions 2.1, 2.4), which is
imposed so as to induce truthful reporting by the agent(s), causes the existence problem
to be quite nonstandard, the constraint of incentive compatibility (used in [10]) presenting
a technically more challenging problem than almost sure incentive compatibility [9, 12, 13].
The inherent technical diculties were solved by Page, by adopting the use of an ab-
stract Komlos theorem from [1]. This theorem has the important advantage of supplying
almost everywhere pointwise convergence information about arithmetic averages in situa-
tions where traditionally only weak convergence information, much more macroscopic in
nature, is available. In yet another development, C.M. Khan showed that a less rened
analogue of the abstract Komlos theorem, viz. Mazur's theorem, can be used to deal with
the existence question, provided that one weakens the notion of a.s. incentive compatibil-
ity considerably. This would seem to conrm a pattern signaled above: the more rened
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the incentive compatibility constraint, the more rened the analysis to solve the associated
existence questions must be. Apart from this essential dierence with Page's existence re-
sults, another conspicuous contrast is that Khan does not require the set of contracts to be
compact. Instead, he imposes monotonicity and other structural conditions upon his utility
function (his space of contracts being two-dimensional). However, as Khan himself shows,
his incentive compatibility and related conditions force the problem to be equivalent to one
with a compact set of contracts. In spite of its more explicit nature, [7] does not provide
explicit conditions under which the expected utility functional is upper semi-continuous and
existence actually occurs (see [7, p. 126]).
The purpose of the present paper is to produce a systematic, general approach to ex-
istence problems involving incentive compatibility. Two principal results are formulated;
together they apply to all situations considered by Page in the papers mentioned above,
and in other situations as well [3]. The essential steps of the approach all stem from the
work by Page. This paper serves to provide a unifying platform for those ideas. Its use of
misspecication subsets of types seems a new idea. This is used in the denition of (a.s.)
incentive compatibility. Together with the use of a suitable -algebra on the space T of all
types, it allows for the simultaneous treatment of single- and multi-agent models.
2 Principal existence results
The treatment in this section is at a rather high level of abstraction; of course, this is
unavoidable if one wishes to bring many applications together. The reader is advised to
refer continuously to section 3 for motivation. Proofs of all results in this section can be
found in section 4.
Let (T; T ; ) be a probability space; elements of T represent the various types (or type-
vectors) of the agent(s). Let K be a subset of a Hausdor locally convex topological space
E; elements of K will be called contracts, and measurable functions from T into K will
be called contract selection mechanisms for the principal. Once she/he adopts the contract
selection mechanism f : T ! K, the principal is committed to oering the contract f(t)
upon being reported the type t. Here measurability is dened with respect to T and the
Borel -algebra B(K) on K. As usual, the topological dual of E (i.e., the set of all linear
continuous functionals on E) is denoted by E

. For x 2 E and x

2 E

we shall write
< x; x

>:= x

(x).
Assumption 2.1 The set K of contracts is convex compact and metrizable for the relative
topology (as inherited from E).
Let , : T ! 2
K
be a multifunction. For a type t agent, ,(t) represents the set of rational
contracts for such an agent. No measurability conditions whatsoever will be needed for ,.
Assumption 2.2 The set ,(t)  K of rational contracts is convex and closed for each
t 2 T .
Below we allow for two dierent notions of rationality and incentive compatibility of
mechanisms, depending on whether they have to hold surely or just almost surely (with
respect to the subjective probability ). For each of these situations we shall present an
existence result, respectively in Theorems 2.1 and 2.2. We now prepare for the rst of these:
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Denition 2.1 (a.s. individual rationality) A contract selection mechanism f is said
to be almost surely individually rational if
f(t) 2 ,(t) for -almost every t 2 T:
Recall that this states that there exists a subset N in T , with (N) = 0 (i.e., N is a
null set for ), such that f(t) 2 ,(t) for all t 2 TnN . Observe that N , the "exceptional
null set" for f 's pointwise belonging to ,, is allowed to vary with f . Although it is not
strictly required, N might be the empty set in some instances (the stronger Denition 2.4
exactly calls for such emptiness). From now on we shall often write "almost every" or even
"a.e." instead of the more formal "-almost every". By S
as
 
we shall denote the set of a.s.
individually rational mechanisms. It should be stressed that measurability is required for
the mechanisms, but not for ,. Let V : T  K ! R be the agent's utility function. An
agent of type t is supposed to use V (t; ) as his/her utility function.
Assumption 2.3 For each t 2 T the type t agent's utility function V (t; ) is ane and
continuous on the set ,(t) of their rational contracts.
Note that a type t agent will not have an incentive to misreport under the mechanism
f if what he/she gets under the contract f(t) is at least as good as what he/she gets by
misreporting his/her type as t
0
. Both these options are evaluated by such an agent via
the utility function V (t; ); hence the rst option is worth V (t; f(t)) utils to the agent,
and the second one V (t; f(t
0
)) utils. The Denitions 2.2 and 2.5 state that (almost surely)
the second utility amount will not exceed the rst one. The following device allows us to
treat multi- and single-agent models simultaneously. Let F : T ! 2
T
be a misspecication
multifunction; for each t 2 T , F (t) is the set from which type t agents can opt tomisreport to
the principal. No form of measurability whatsoever is required for F . In several applications
below it is natural to use F (t)  T ; however, when treating the multi-agent setup it is
essential to use a dierent misspecication multifunction F .
Denition 2.2 (a.s. incentive compatibility) A contract selection mechanism f is said
to be almost surely incentive compatible if for almost every t
V (t; f(t))  V (t; f(t
0
)) for all t
0
2 F (t).
This notion is encountered in e.g. [9, 11, 12, 13]. In [7] Khan requires the above inequality
to hold only for all t
0
not in some -null set. This would seem to be a weaker and intuitively
less convincing notion. Let S
as
IC
denote the set of all mechanisms that are a.s. incentive
compatible.
Let U : T  K ! [ 1;+1) be the principal's utility function. The assumptions to
follow allow us to dene the principal's expected utility function. Namely, the expected
utility of the mechanism f 2 S
 
is given by
I
U
(f) :=
Z
T
U(t; f(t))(dt);
where  gives the principal's (subjective) probability distribution of the various types.
Assumption 2.4 The principal's utility function U is T  B(K)-measurable.
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Let us note that instead of product measurability one could do with mere T -measurability
of U(; f()) for all f 2 S
as
 
\S
as
IC
(in fact, it would even be possible to abandon measurability
for the principal's utility altogether by adopting outer integration [1, 2]).
Assumption 2.5 There exists a -integrable function  : T ! R such that for each f 2
S
as
 
\ S
IC
U(t; f(t))   (t) a.e.
Assumption 2.6 For each type t in T the function U(t; ) is concave and upper semicon-
tinuous on ,(t).
Assumption 2.7 The set S
as
 
\S
as
IC
of all a.s. individually rational, a.s. incentive compat-
ible mechanisms is nonempty.
Denition 2.3 The principal's maximization problem (P
as
) consists of maximizing the
expected utility I
U
(f) over all mechanisms f in S
as
 
\ S
as
IC
.
Theorem 2.1 Under the Assumptions 2.1{2.7 there exists an optimal mechanism for the
principal's utility maximization problem (P
as
).
Next, we prepare for a closely related but stronger existence result, for which also
stronger conditions are needed.
Denition 2.4 (individual rationality) A contract selection mechanism f is said to be
individually rational if
f(t) 2 ,(t) for every t 2 T:
By S
 
we denote the set of individually rational mechanisms. Clearly, this set is contained
in the earlier set S
as
 
. Note that this new notion of individual rationality no longer depends
on the subjective probability distribution . A similar comment applies to the following
notion, which ensures that none of the agents has an incentive to misreport her/his type.
Denition 2.5 (incentive compatibility) A contract selection mechanism f is said to
be incentive compatible if for all t
V (t; f(t))  V (t; f(t
0
)) for all t
0
2 F (t).
By S
IC
we denote the set of all mechanisms that are incentive compatible. Clearly, S
IC
is
contained in the earlier set S
as
IC
.
Assumption 2.8 The set S
 
\S
IC
of all individually rational, incentive compatible mech-
anisms is nonempty.
Evidently, this is a little stronger than Assumption 2.7. Moreover, an extra measurability
condition will be used for V :
Assumption 2.9 The utility function V is T  B(K)-measurable.
Denition 2.6 The principal's maximization problem (P ) consists of maximizing the ex-
pected utility I
U
(f) over all mechanisms f in S
 
\ S
IC
.
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Theorem 2.2 Under the Assumptions 2.1{2.6, 2.8 and the extra Assumption 2.9 there
exists an optimal mechanism for the principal's utility maximization problem (P ). This
same mechanism is also optimal for (P
as
).
In the proof, the optimal mechanism for (P ) will come about by suitably modifying
the optimal mechanism for (P
as
) on the exceptional null set implicit in the denition of
a.s. incentive compatibility. A useful sucient condition for Assumption 2.8 to hold is as
follows:
Proposition 2.1 Suppose that the multifunction , has the following special form:
,(t) := fx 2 K : V (t; x)  r(t)g; t 2 T;
where r : T ! R is some reservation value function (not necessarily measurable).
a. Suppose that ,(t) 6= ; a.e. Then Assumption 2.7 follows from the other assumptions of
Theorem 2.1, provided that Assumption 2.9 holds in addition.
b. Suppose that ,(t) 6= ; for every t 2 T . Then Assumption 2.8 follows from the other
assumptions of Theorem 2.2.
3 Applications
This section indicates how improvements of the main results of [9, 12, 13] all follow from
Theorem 2.1 and how an improvement of the main result of [10] follows from Theorem 2.2.
Since it would be most uneconomical to repeat here all the details of the models used in
those papers, let us restrict ourselves to the main features of the implementation of the
abstract existence results. Also, for each paper the improvements will be mentioned which
follow from adopting Theorem 2.1 or 2.2. The reader is expected to ll out the details; in
doing so, she/he is warned to observe the fact that no uniform terminology exists concerning
the fundamental notions in this area. For instance, "incentive compatibility" in [9] is our
present a.s. incentive compatibility (Denition 2.1), and "a.e. incentive compatibility" in
[7] is a notion that is weaker than our present a.s. incentive compatibility.
In several applications the contracts will be mixed, i.e., K consists of the set P(Y ) of
all probability measures on some topological space Y , equipped with its Borel -algebra.
In this situation E is taken to be the set of all bounded signed measures on Y , equipped
with the classical narrow topology [5, III.54]. The following propositions are then useful for
verifying the various assumptions used in Theorems 2.1 and 2.2.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that Y is a compact metric space and that t 7! Y (t) is a multi-
function from T into 2
Y
with closed values. Then Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 hold for K := P(Y )
and for , : T ! 2
K
given by
,(t) := P(Y (t)) := f 2 P(Y ) : (Y (t)) = 1g:
Proposition 3.2 Let Y and Y (t), t 2 T , be as above. Suppose v : T  Y ! R and
u : T  Y ! [ 1;+1) are such that
v(t; ) is bounded and continuous on Y (t) for each t 2 T ,
u(t; ) is upper semicontinuous on Y (t) for each t 2 T ,
u is T  B(Y )-measurable,
u(t; y)   (t) for all t 2 T ,
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for some integrable function  : T ! R: Then Assumptions 2.3{2.6 hold for V : TP(Y )!
R and U : T P(Y )! [ 1;+1) given by
V (t; ) :=
Z
Y (t)
v(t; y)(dy); U(t; ) :=
Z
Y (t)
u(t; y)(dy):
Moreover, if also
v is T  B(Y )-measurable,
then Assumption 2.9 holds.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. All convexity considerations are trivial, so Assumption 2.1
follows by [5, III.60] and Assumption 2.2 follows by [5, III.58, III.60], since each Y (t) is
compact. QED
Proof of Proposition 3.2. As before, all convexity/anity/concavity considerations are
trivial. Therefore, validity of Assumption 2.3 follows directly from the denition of the nar-
row topology. Similarly, Assumption 2.6 holds directly by [5, III.55]. As for Assumption 2.4,
consider rst the case where u is the characteristic function of some set in T B(Y ). In this
case the desired result follows directly from the proof of Theorem IV.12 in [4, pp. 103-104].
But once this is known, the usual approximation of u by means of step functions shows
that the desired result is also valid for general u. Also, observe that Assumption 2.5 follows
very simply from the given inequality for u Under the additional condition for v, validity
of Assumption 2.9 is proven in almost the same way as Assumption 2.4, by applying the
approximation by step functions to the positive and negative part of v. QED
3.1 Stackelberg games [9]
In [9] Page considers a Stackelberg game with incomplete information in the mixed contract
setting of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2. Also, his denition of individual rationality is as given
in Proposition 2.1. Improving upon Page's existence result for a problem of type (P
as
),
we shall show that his conditions also allow for an existence result as in Theorem 2.2. In
the notation of [9], one should substitute for (T; T ; ) its probability space (;; m), for
K the set P (X) of all probability measures on its compact metric space X , for ,(t) its sets
P(X(t)), where X() is its multifunction dened on its p. 415 (it is of the kind postulated
in Proposition 2.1). Further, we should substitute for v its function f

, dened on p. 414,
and for u its function g

, as given on p. 418 (correspondingly, our V and U are called F

and G

in [9]). We use simply F (t) := T =  in the denition of S
IC
. Let us check that
the conditions of Theorem 2.2 apply. Above, we saw that the conditions of Proposition 3.1
hold; also, those of Proposition 3.2 apply: the needed properties of v = f

can be found
on p. 414 (including the additional measurability) and those of u = g

on p. 419. By [A-
2] in [9], Proposition 2.1.b applies. Therefore, the existence of an optimal mechanism for
(P ) follows. This improves upon [9, Theorem 5.1], where only the existence of an optimal
solution for (P
as
) is proven.
3.2 Principal-single agent models with incomplete information [10]
In [10] a principal-agent model is given with incomplete information about a single agent.
Theorem 2.2 applies to this model, and this leads to at least one improvement. In [10],
one should substitute (T; T ; ) for its probability space (;B(); m). In [A-1] of [10], 
is supposed to be a separable metric and complete space, but here we shall not need this
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topological assumption. We again use here F (t)  T . Proposition 2.1.b applies here; its
condition is fullled by [A-4] in [10] (note that it would already be enough to have the
slightly lighter condition of Proposition 2.1.a hold here). Also, Proposition 3.1 applies to
[10]; its conditions are seen to hold by p. 327 and p. 330 of [10], where one should substitute
for our Y Page's space K and for Y (t) Page'sK(t). Further, we may invoke Proposition 3.2,
with the substitutions v := V

and u := U

, in view of p. 330 and p. 332 of [10].
3.3 Principal-multiple agent models with incomplete information: mixed
contracts [12]
In [12] a multi-agent contract auction model is considered. As announced in section 2, this
type of model can be incorporated into the framework of section 2 by an adroit choice of
the misspecication sets and the -algebra T . Here the fact that Theorem 2.2 does not
ask for measurability conditions for V , but only for U , plays a signicant role. To capture
Page's existence result, we substitute for T Page's I   (his I indexes the agents, and
 := 
i2I

i
is the set of all type-vectors). This T should be equipped with the special
product -algebra T := f;; Ig  B(). Observe that this has the eect of making T -
measurable functions depend essentially on the -part only of t = (i; ). The measure  is
given by (I  B) := (B), where  is the given measure on  as in [12]. Let us already
note that Page uses topological conditions for  { of the kind specied in the previous
subsection { that are not really needed in our approach. To capture the multi-agent setup
entirely, we now dene for t = (i; )
F (t) := f(i; 
 i
; 
0
i
) : 
0
i
2 
i
g:
where 
 i
:= (
j
)
j 6=i
. Thus, given i and the type-vector , only agent i is allowed to
misreport her/his type. Otherwise, Page works again with the reservation value setup,
described in Proposition 2.1. He also works with a mixed contract setup, which is now
slightly at variance with the one described in Propositions 3.1{3.2. Namely, in his model
we can substitute Y := I  , v := G

, u := F

, and both his G

and F

are T  B(Y )-
measurable (they depend only upon the part  in t = (i; )). As for U , in [12] its denition
is as in Proposition 3.2, and the conditions of that proposition are easily seen to hold (see
p. 16 and Proposition 3.2.1 of [12]). But in the denition of V the individual's index i
reappears:
V ((i; ); ) :=
Z
fig
v(; y)(dy):
Of course, this destroys T -measurability for V , but, as observed above, we do not need it
for Theorem 2.1. But even though V is not exactly as in Proposition 3.2, continuity of V
in its second variable, as desired in Assumption 2.3, can still easily be proven because of
the discrete character of the topology on the rst component of Y := I   (see p. 16 of
[12]). Proposition 3.1 applies completely to [12], quite similar to the previous examples.
Finally, Proposition 2.1, with its appeal to Assumption 2.9, fails to hold. This has been
counteracted by stepping up the nonemptiness assumption in [12]: it is easy to see that
[A-4] of [12], which asks for a constant function to lie in S
 
, causes that same constant also
to belong to S
IC
.
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3.4 Principal-multiple agent models with incomplete information: pure
contracts [13]
In [13], a pure variant of the auction model in [12] was given. To capture and improve the
main existence result in [13], we dene (T; T ; ) and the misspecication sets F (t) as in
Example . In the notation of [13], we now substitute K :=  C and ,(t) := K(t), with
K(i; ) := f(p; ) 2 C : p
i
v
i
()  
i
 0g. These satisfy Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 by the
compactness conditions on p. 4 of [13].
1
Also, in the notation of [13], we should substitute
V (i; ; (p; )) := p
i
v
i
()  
i
. and U(i; ; (p; )) := u(v
0
()(1 
P
j
p
j
)) +
P
j

j
. We observe
that Assumption 2.3 is evident and that Assumption 2.9 does not hold, as happened in
the previous subsection. Note how Page's assumption that u be concave and nondecreasing
implies that U(i; ; ) is concave, as it should be in Assumption 2.6. In this case the structure
of V is so simple that Assumption 2.7 holds instantly: any constant function identically
equal to (p; 0) 2 C lies in S
 
\S
IC
. Applying Theorem 2.1 gives a slight generalization
of the main existence result of [13] for (P
as
): once again, the topological conditions for ,
imposed in [13], turn out to be redundant.
3.5 Principal-single agent models with incomplete information: pure state-
contingent contracts [3]
In [3] Balder and Yannelis consider a model with state-contingent contracts, suggested by
F.H. Page. In terms of their paper, we should make the following substitutions: K := L
1
X
,
V := I
U
2
, U := I
U
1
. They use a reservation value setup for , as in Proposition 2.1. Since
they already refer to the present paper to deduce their main result, the reader can nd in
[3] a check-list of all the verications of the assumptions used in Theorem 2.1.
4 Proofs of the main results
The proofs of Theorems 2.1, 2.2 are quite nontrivial and nonstandard because the delicate
nature of the incentive compatibility constraint requires special attention. Those proofs are
based on ideas of Page and involve two auxiliary results. The rst of these is the following
specialization of an abstract Komlos-type result, given in [1, Theorem 2.1].
Theorem 4.1 i. Let (f
k
) be a sequence of mechanisms in S
as
 
. Under Assumptions 2.1,
2.2 and 2.6 there exist a subsequence (f
m
) of (f
k
) and a mechanism f

in S
as
 
such that
2
lim
n!1
1
n
n
X
m=1
f
m
(t) = f

(t) a.e.
ii. Moreover,
lim sup
k
I
U
(f
k
)  I
U
(f

):
Proof. We shall apply Theorem 2.1 of [1]. In view of Assumption 2.1, it follows by
[4, III.31] that there exists a countable subset (x

j
) of E

which separates the points of K.
1
Surely C in [13] must be supposed convex; otherwise, it is impossible to see where the convexity con-
clusion for D \ , in [13, Theorem 2.2.3] should come from.
2
This pointwise convergence of the averages continues to hold { with the same f

but with varying
exceptional null sets { for every subsequence of subsequence (f
m
).
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Dene a
j
(t; x) :=< x; x

j
> on T E. For h as in [1, Theorem 2.1] we simply use h := 0 on
T  K and h := +1 on T  (EnK) (indeed, sup
k
I
h
(f
k
) = 0 < +1 and Assumption 2.1
causes h(t; ) to be trivially inf-compact on E for each t). Note also that Assumption 2.1
implies that 
j
:= sup
x2K
< x; x

j
> is nite for each j. Hence, property (B) of [1] holds.
Thus, we may apply Theorem 2.1 of [1]. This gives the existence of a subsequence (f
m
) and
a function f

such that the desired convergence statement holds. By [5, I.15], f

, being the
pointwise limit of a sequence of measurable functions, is measurable. By Assumption 2.2 it
also follows easily that f

belongs to S
 
. Part ii follows directly by [1, Corollary 2.2]. QED
Recall that a compact-valued multifunction  : T ! K is said to be measurable [4,
III.2] if for every open or closed O  K the set

 
(O) := ft 2 T : (t) \O 6= ;g 2 T :
Lemma 4.1 Let (g
n
) be a sequence of mechanisms g
n
: T ! K. Under Assumption 2.1
the multifunction L! 2
K
given by
L(t) := \
1
p=1
closure fg
n
(t) : n  pg;
is measurable.
Proof. Start by noting that for each t 2 T one has x 2 L(t) if and only if there exists
a subsequence of (g
n
(t)) converging to x. Let O  K be an arbitrary open set. Then
t 2 L
 
(O) if and only if there exist m 2 N and a subsequence of (g
n
(t)) contained entirely
in the set O
m
:= fx 2 K : dist(x;KnO) > 1=mg.
3
Indeed, if t 2 L
 
(O) then there exists
x 2 L(t)\O. For somem 2 N this gives x 2 L(t)\O
m
, so the desired subsequence is easily
found by what was said in the rst line of this proof, since O
m
is open. Conversely, if there
exist m 2 N and a subsequence of (g
n
(t)) contained in O
m
, then, by Assumption 2.1, a
further subsequence will converge to some x in the closure of O
m
(i.e. dist(x;KnO)  1=m),
and this closure is contained in O. We conclude from this characterization that
L
 
(O) = [
m
\
p
[
np
ft 2 T : f
n
(t) 2 O
m
g;
which demonstrates that L
 
(O) 2 T . QED
The above proof is from rst principles; the result also follows by applying [4, III.4].
Proof of Theorem 2.1. By hypothesis the feasible set S
as
 
\ S
as
IC
for (P
as
) is nonempty.
So there exists certainly a maximizing sequence for (P
as
). That is to say, there exists a
sequence (f
k
) in S
as
 
\ S
as
IC
, with lim
k
I
U
(f
k
) = sup(P
as
). Application of Theorem 4.1 to
(f
k
) gives the existence of a null set N in T , a subsequence (f
m
) and f

2 S
as
 
such that
f

(t) = lim
n
s
n
(t) for every t 62 N . Here s
n
(t) :=
1
n
P
n
m=1
f
m
(t). By part ii of Theorem 4.1,
I
U
(f

)  sup(P
as
): (4:1)
Let us redene f

(t) on N : consider the multifunction L : N ! 2
K
, given by
L(t) := \
1
p=1
closure fs
n
(t) : n  pg
3
Here "dist" refers to distance with respect to a xed metric on K.
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By Lemma 4.1, this multifunction (which we need to consider only on N) is measurable.
Evidently, by Assumption 2.1 the values of L are nonempty (use the nite intersection
property) and compact. Therefore, L has a measurable selection f

: N ! K [4, III.6]. In
view of (4.1), all that is needed to nish the proof now is to check that f

, thus altered on
N , is a.s. incentive compatible. Note that by incentive compatibility of the f
m
's and by
Assumption 2.3
V (t; s
n
(t))  V (t; s
n
(t
0
)) for all t 2 TnN
0
, all t
0
2 F (t) and all n 2 N. (4:2)
Here N
0
is a null set; it is the union of all exceptional null sets involved in the a.s. incentive
compatibility denition of the f
m
's. Let t 2 Tn(N
0
[ N) and t
0
2 F (t) be arbitrary. If
t
0
62 N , then both s
n
(t)! f

(t) and s
n
(t
0
)! f

(t
0
). Thus, by (4.2) and Assumption 2.3
V (t; f

(t))  V (t; f

(t
0
)): (4:3)
If t
0
2 N , then (4.3) holds as well. Indeed, by the alteration of f

on N made above,
f

(t
0
) is a limit point of (s
n
(t
0
)) (this is seen easily to be implied by the denition of the
multifunction L; it was also observed in the proof of Lemma 4.1 above). Hence, there exists
some subsequence (s
n
j
) of (s
n
) (its dependence on t
0
does not matter for the argument to go
through) such that (s
n
(t
0
)) converges to f

(t
0
). But because t 62 N , the sequence (s
n
j
(t)),
obtained when the same subsequence is evaluated in the point t, converges to f

(t). Using
(4.2) this gives
V (t; f

(t)) V (t; s
n
j
(t))  V (t; s
n
j
(t
0
))! V (t; f

(t));
so (4.3) follows again. We therefore conclude that f

is a.s. incentive compatible. QED
For the proof of Theorem 2.2 the following result is also needed. As shown here, when
[4, III.39] is restricted to compact-valued multifunctions, it can be sharpened so as to give
T -measurability instead of measurability with respect to the -completion of T . Although
this is an obvious modication, we supply a proof that starts from rst principles.
Lemma 4.2 Let  : T ! 2
K
be a measurable multifunction with nonempty compact values.
Also, suppose that V satises Assumptions 2.3 and 2.9. Then the multifunction 
max
: T !
2
K
, given by

max
(t) := arg max
x2(t)
V (t; x);
is measurable.
Proof. Of course, for every t

max
(t) = fy 2 (t) : V (t; y) = sup
x2(t)
V (t; x)g:
Because  is measurable, it has a Castaing representation [4, III.9]. That is, there exists a
countable subset fx
j
: j 2 Ng of measurable selections of  such that
(t) = closure of fx
j
(t) : j 2 Ng
for each t 2 T . Hence, by Assumption 2.3
V
max
(t) := sup
x2(t)
V (t; x) = sup
j
V (t; x
j
(t)) for all t 2 T:
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Since each t 7! V (t; x
j
(t)) is evidently T -measurable, so is V
max
: T ! R, dened above.
Now we can prove the desired measurability of 
max
. Let O  K be an arbitrary open
set. For each m 2 N, let O
m
be the set fx 2 K : dist(x;KnO) > 1=mg; this set is open,
and of course [
m
O
m
= O. So given t 2 
 
(O), there must be y 2 (t) and m 2 N such
that y 2 
max
(t) \ O
m
. It follows easily from the above Castaing representation of  and
Assumption 2.3 that then for every i 2 N there exists j such that
f
j
(t) 2 O
m
and V (t; f
j
(t))  V
max
(t) 
1
i
: (4:4)
Conversely, if there exists n such that to every i there corresponds j with (4.4), then
t must belong to 
 
(O). Indeed, the corresponding subsequence of f
j
(t)'s will have a
convergent subsequence and a corresponding limit point z (by compactness of the set (t)).
Assumption 2.3 then gives V (t; z) = V
max
(t), since z lies in the set (t). Hence, z 2 
max
(t).
But the closure of O
m
is still contained in O, so z 2 O as well. Together, these observations
show that

 
(O) = [
n
\
i
[
j
f
 1
j
(O
m
) \ ft 2 T : V (t; f
j
(t))  V
max
(t) 
1
i
g:
By the demonstrated measurability of V
max
and the measurability of the f
j
's this proves
that 
 
(O) belongs to T . QED
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.1 there exists a maximizing
sequence (f
k
) in S
 
\S
IC
, with lim
k
I
U
(f
k
) = sup(P ). Again Theorem 4.1 gives the existence
of a subsequence (f
m
) and f

in S
as
 
such that for s
n
(t) :=
1
n
P
n
m=1
f
m
(t) one has
s
n
(t)! f

(t) for every t 62 N . (4:5)
Note already that by (f
m
(t))  ,(t) for all t we get f

(t) 2 ,(t) for t 62 N , by Assump-
tion 2.2. Just as in the proof of Theorem 2.1, we also nd that I
U
(f

)  sup(P ). We shall
alter f

on N again, but in a dierent way than before (still following ideas of F. Page). Let
L : N ! 2
K
be as dened in the proof of Theorem 2.1. This time, L(t)  ,(t) for all t 2 N ,
by (f
m
(t))  ,(t) and Assumption 2.2. By Lemma 4.1, L is a measurable multifunction
(on N). This fact allows us to invoke Lemma 4.2, and we nd existence of a measurable
function
^
f : N ! K with
^
f(t) 2 arg max
L(t)
V (t; )  L(t)  ,(t) for all t 2 N . Clearly,
by dening f

(t) := f

(t) for t 2 TnN and f

(t) :=
^
f(t) for t 2 N , we obtain a function
f

2 S
 
with f

= f

a.e., whence I
U
(f

)  sup(P ). It remains to check that f

is
incentive compatible. By Assumption 2.3, we know that
V (t; s
n
(t))  V (t; s
n
(t
0
)) for all t 2 T , all t
0
2 F (t) and all n 2 N (4:6)
by incentive compatibility of the f
m
's. Let t 2 T and t
0
2 F (t) be arbitrary. Below we shall
distinguish four dierent cases. If t 62 N , t
0
62 N , then s
n
(t)! f

(t) and s
n
(t
0
)! f

(t
0
), so
(4.6) implies
V (t; f

(t))  V (t; f

(t
0
)): (4:7)
by Assumption 2.3. Secondly, if t 62 N and t
0
2 N , then (4.7) holds as well. Indeed,
f

(t
0
) =
^
f(t
0
) is still a limit point of (s
n
(t
0
)), so there exists a subsequence (s
n
j
(t
0
)) of
(s
n
(t
0
)) which converges to f

(t
0
). But evaluating at t 62 N also gives that (s
n
j
(t)) converges
to f

(t) = f

(t) by (4.5). By (4.6)
V (t; f

(t)) V (t; s
n
j
(t))  V (t; s
n
j
(t
0
))! V (t; f

(t));
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so (4.7) follows. Conversely, if t 2 N and t
0
62 N , then (4.7) holds as well. Indeed, it then
reduces to V (t;
^
f(t))  V (t; f

(t
0
)), which follows by (4.6) and the "argmax" property of
^
t,
since
V (t; f

(t)) = V (t;
^
f(t))  V (t; s
n
(t))  V (t; s
n
(t
0
))! V (t; f

(t
0
))
again using Assumption 2.3. Fourthly, if both t and t
0
belong to N , then, working with the
same subsequence (s
n
j
(t
0
)) as above, we have by (4.6)
V (t; f

(t) = V (t;
^
f(t))  V (t; s
n
j
(t))  V (t; s
n
j
(t
0
))! V (t; f

(t)):
So (4.7) has been shown to hold in all possible cases. This proves that f

is incentive
compatible. We conclude that f

belongs to S
 
\S
IC
and that I
U
(f

= sup(P ). That f

should also be optimal for (P
as
) is an obvious consequence of its being the modication of
f

, the optimal solution for (P
as
), on a null set. QED
Proof of Proposition 2.1. By Lemma 4.2 the multifunction t 7! arg max
x2K
V (t; x) is
measurable, and has nonempty values (the latter by the Weierstrass theorem). By the
measurable selection theorem [4, III.6], this multifunction has a measurable selection
~
f .
We conclude that V (t;
~
f(t)) = max
x2K
V (t; x) for all t. Evidently, this implies
~
f 2 S
IC
.
Also, the nonemptiness hypothesis of part a gives V (t;
~
f(t))  r(t) for a.e. t, and for part
b the same inquality holds for all t. QED
5 Epilogue
It has been shown that the existence results for several models can be unied and derived
from essentially two dierent (but related) existence results, viz., Theorems 2.1 and 2.2.
To see the essential contours of Page's approach to the existence question for the class
of models considered here should not only be useful in studying and classifying Page's
work, but also to deal with new, more complex situations. Undoubtedly, the present model
should be rened for that purpose. For instance, as yet the present author has not been
able to deduce Page's recent existence results of [11], where a Bayesian multi-agent model
is considered, from the present work.
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